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runs throughout the narrative is how
different laws, regulations, and political
environments over time have resulted in
disparate migrant policies. Cubans, for
example, benefited from the “wet foot/
dry foot” policy, which did not apply
to Haitian migrants, who were viewed
as fleeing not for political reasons but
for economic ones. Noble paints a vivid
picture that highlights the experiences
of all the participants from all aspects.
A strong point of this work is Noble’s
research, which includes visiting and
photographing locations in Cuba that
have played a significant role in the
migrant story. He also excels in bringing out little-known aspects of migrant
life. For example, a fact not commonly
known is that since 1999 the U.S. Coast
Guard has had a liaison officer assigned
to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.
The Mariel boatlift of April 1980, in
which at least 7,665 Cubans arrived in
southern Florida, is well documented,
but the number lost in that exodus is
unknown. The Mariel boatlift was actually the second of three large migrant
attempts from Cuba by sea. The third
wave of evacuees made for the United
States between 1991 and 1994, when the
Coast Guard intercepted over forty-five
thousand Cubans. I was stationed in Miami in 1993–94 and recall seeing several
Cuban fishermen who had been rescued
by the Coast Guard and were detained
at its base at Miami Beach. They chose
to return. Was their look of apprehension because of what the United States
would do or how their own government
would respond when they returned?
Noble gives equal treatment to the
plight of the evacuees of Haiti, while
the Chinese migrant story has a
peculiarly sinister aspect. Since June
1993, when the coastal freighter Golden
Venture was grounded off Queens,
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New York City, the Coast Guard has
found itself involved in a humansmuggling operation the likes of which
it has never encountered before. It has
involved the canny smugglers known
as “Sister Ping” and the “snakeheads.”
Noble rounds out his book with a look
at the politics and policies of migrant
interdiction and includes some of his
own recommendations for the problem.
The only distraction, albeit a minor
one, is the overuse of acronyms, which
breaks up Noble’s otherwise smooth
narrative. However, this in no way
should deter anyone from reading
this interesting work. It is obvious
that Noble has a clear passion for the
Coast Guard and a deep respect for
the men and women who serve in it.
Dennis Noble has given maritime
history a solid and well documented
book on a mission unique to the
U.S. Coast Guard—a mission not
likely to go away anytime soon.
CDR. DAVID L. TESKA, U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE

San Diego, California
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It has been said that “weapons speak
to the wise—but in general they need
interpreters.” Political scientist Christopher P. Twomey, associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School,
in Monterey, California, shows the
difficulty of that interpretation. He
makes a strong case that the existence
of different military languages—that
is, different doctrines—explains
otherwise puzzling examples of
deterrence failure and escalation.
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The Military Lens is a welcome addition
to the literature on deterrence, which
too often treats actors as interchangeable “black boxes.” Twomey writes in the
spirit of authors like Robert Jervis, who
explored psychological factors that lead
to misinterpretation of others’ actions.
This work adds a new factor, however
—military doctrine. All militaries
have doctrines, or “theory of victory.”
Doctrine is a service’s vision of how its
resources are used to achieve operational success. The author’s core argument is that strategists look through a
doctrinal “lens” when assessing capabilities and intentions, which weakens
deterrence in two ways: the credibility
of others’ threats is discounted if their
doctrines are thought ineffective,
and others’ signals are missed if one’s
own doctrine is used as a template for
indicators. This attention to misperceptions at the level of operational
net assessment is new and of direct
relevance to planners and analysts.
Much of the book tests this new theory
against three Korean War episodes:
China’s failure to deter U.S. movement
north of the thirty-eighth parallel; U.S.
failure to deter China from entering the
war; and the less-well-known maritime
story of the American deterrence of a
planned Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Twomey traces the dramatic American
and People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
underestimations of each other’s landwarfare capabilities, leading to threats
being noticed but not considered
credible. The PLA Navy, with officers
educated largely abroad, understood
that U.S. air supremacy rendered landings impossible. The author’s choice of
the 1950 cases was wise, because other
than the PLA Army/Navy differences,
most of the variables are constant. A
notable feature of the case studies is the
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author’s archival research, conducted
in both the United States and China.
The fresh documentation alone will
appeal to Korean War specialists.
Doctrinal difference fits the Korean
War, but the radical divergence of the
revolutionary PLA and the atomic
American military makes this an easier
case, which Twomey acknowledges.
How often do doctrinal differences lead
to deterrence failures generally? An
additional chapter argues that in two
Arab-Israeli cases deterrence failure is
correlated with doctrinal divergence.
The evidence is suggestive but could be
strengthened with a larger universe of
cases, which might answer additional
questions. For example: Are doctrinal
differences more common in ground
than naval warfare? Do opponents in
long-lasting rivalries (compared to
the United States–China in 1950) fare
better at assessing each others’ capability despite different doctrines?
Twomey offers a warning that clear,
credible threats may not be understood as such by others. Since doctrinal
misperceptions take place at the military
level, the lessons here are particularly
relevant to planners, as they develop
assessments and deterrent options for
civilian leaders. This work also holds
implications for professional military
education. Officers should be encouraged to overcome doctrinal filters,
scholars should study foreign doctrines,
and educational exchanges might
reduce misunderstandings (the author
himself is involved in U.S.-Chinese
dialogues). Perhaps weapons speak a
common tongue, but Twomey reminds
us that it is the militaries who need
to be fluent in multiple languages.
DAVID BURBACH

Naval War College
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